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Asadi: Renegade or Precursor of
Who Is a Whistleblower Under the
Dodd-Frank Act?
Mystica M. Alexander, John O. Hayward, & David
Missirian*
I.

Introduction

Whistleblowers have a long and honorable history. From
Ralph Nader blowing the whistle on the hazards of GM’s Corvair
in Unsafe at Any Speed1 in the 1960’s to Jeffrey Wigand in 1996
exposing the duplicity of the tobacco industry,2 whistleblowers
have put conscience ahead of career and personal success to
expose corporate fraud and wrongdoing. Not surprisingly, they
have had to endure ridicule and ostracism as well as financial
hardship.
Legislation has sought to protect them from
retribution,3 often with mixed success.4 The most recent
legislative effort is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) that allows
whistleblowers to collect a bounty for the whistleblowing5 and
also protects the whistleblower from retaliatory acts by his or

Mystica Alexander is an Assistant Professor at Bentley University. John
Hayward is an Adjunct Senior Lecturer at Bentley University. David
Missirian is a Senior Lecturer at Bentley University.
1. See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
2. See Jeffrey Wigand on 60 Minutes, February 4, 1996,
JEFFREYWIGAND.COM, http://www.jeffreywigand.com/60minutes.php (last
visited Mar. 18, 2015). Wigand’s whistle blowing was the subject of the film
The Insider (1999).
3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010).
4. See Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow: An Analysis of
Corporate Whistleblowers, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875, 891 (2002) (reporting that
about 25-33% of whistleblower retaliation suits are successful). See also Anne
Kates Smith, The Elusive Rewards and High Costs of Being a Whistleblower,
KIPLINGER, http://www.kiplinger.com/article/business/T012-C000-S002-highcosts-of-being-a-whistleblower.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
*
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her employer.6 One of the challenges currently dividing the
courts is determining who should come within the protection of
the legislation. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Asadi v.
GE Energy,7 interpreted the definition of “whistleblower” quite
narrowly to encompass only those individuals who make
information available directly to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). This interpretation by the Fifth Circuit not
only rejects the broader interpretation of SEC regulations, but
is also inconsistent with the decisions of various district courts
that have considered this question. Part I opens with a
discussion of the requirements of “whistleblower” status under
both the statutory language of Dodd-Frank and the
accompanying SEC regulations. Part II reviews the Asadi
decision and calls into question the soundness of the court’s
decision to disregard SEC regulations. Part III explores the
circumstances in which administrative regulations are entitled
to deference and those situations in which they may be
disregarded as an overreach of power. Part IV surveys several
district court decisions that have interpreted the term
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank. Part V argues that even
public policy dictates that the courts should adopt a broad
interpretation of “whistleblower” so as to provide maximum
safeguards against fraud and abuse. The paper concludes that
the Fifth Circuit in Asadi reached an incorrect result, and,
therefore, that this renegade decision which advocates a narrow
scope of whistleblower protection should be rejected in future
judicial interpretations of who is a whistleblower.
II. Understanding the Protections of Dodd-Frank
Dodd-Frank was enacted at a time of public disenchantment
with American business due to illegal corporate activities and a
lack of transparency.
The legislation established a
whistleblower protection program, the origins of which can be
traced back to financial regulatory reform proposed in 2009.8
6. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
7. See Asadi v. G. E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
8. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet:
Administration's Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward; Legislation
Strengthening Investor Protection Delivered to Capitol Hill (July 10, 2009),
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The goal of enhancing protection for whistleblowers was found
to be significant to ushering in an era of financial reform.
According to a Treasury Department press release, at the initial
proposal for financial reform that ultimately led to Dodd-Frank,
expanding SEC authority to incentivize whistleblowers was
considered key as “[t]his authority will encourage insiders and
others with strong evidence of securities law violations to bring
that evidence to the SEC and improve its ability to enforce the
securities laws.”9
A. The Statutory Definition of Whistleblower Is Contradictory
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank amended the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding a new Section 21F entitled,
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” This new
legislation at subsection 6(a)(6) defines the term whistleblower
as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission
(SEC), in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”10 This statutory language indicates that to be
considered a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank one must
actually report information to the SEC.
Another provision of Section 21F intended to strengthen
protection for whistleblowers is the anti-retaliation provision of
subsection 6(h)(1)(A) which provides that:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any
other
manner
discriminate
against,
a
whistleblower in other terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower(i) in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;

available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg205.aspx.
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).

3

890

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action
of the Commission based upon or related to such
information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
[the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] . . . or any
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.11
While the definition found in subsection 6(a)(6) clearly
requires reporting to the SEC as a prerequisite of whistleblower
status, item (iii) of subsection 6(h)(1)(A) seemingly opens the
possibility of other methods of reporting.
By their own terms the first two anti-retaliation
categories protect whistleblowers who report
potentially illegal activity to the SEC or who work
with the SEC directly, concerning potential
securities violations.
By contrast, the third
category does not require the whistleblower to
have interacted directly with the SEC - only that
the disclosure, to whomever made, was “required
or protected” by certain laws within the SEC’s
jurisdiction.12
To reconcile these seemingly contradictory definitions we
first look to administrative regulations.

B. Administrative Regulations Broaden the Whistleblower
Definition
Section 924 of Dodd-Frank directed the SEC enact

11. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
12. Mark J. Oberti, Practical Applications in Employment Law: A New
Wave of Employment Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
43, 91-92 (2012).
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regulations to implement the statute’s mandates.13
The SEC regulation implementing the anti-retaliation
provision of the statute provides:
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections
afforded by . . . 78u-6(h)(1), you are a
whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the
information you are providing relates to a possible
securities law violation . . . that has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide information in a manner
described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) . . .14
Provision (ii) incorporates the anti-retaliation provisions of
Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that provides protections
for employees of public companies when the employees report
information to (1) a federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency, (ii) any member of Congress or a committee of Congress,
or (iii) a person with supervisory authority over the employee or
any other person working for the employer who has authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct. These reporting
options apply to public companies and so offer no relief to
employees of private companies.15
This regulatory language allowing reporting to the
employer’s internal reporting system rather than directly to the
SEC seems at odds with the statutory language of Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower definition which includes only those reporting
directly to the SEC. In its explanation of the SEC’s seeming
expansion of the “whistleblower” definition to encompass those
who do not report directly to the SEC, the SEC acknowledged
that “[a] significant issue discussed in the Proposing Release [of
the regulations] was the impact of the whistleblower program on
companies’ internal compliance processes.”16 The regulations
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (2015).
15. See Chelsea Hunt Overhuls, Unfinished Business: Dodd-Frank's
Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections Fall Short For Private Companies
and Their Employers, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1 (2012).
16. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
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included proposals to encourage potential whistleblowers to
utilize internal compliance.17
According to the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, “The
whistleblower program was designed to complement, rather
than replace, existing corporate compliance programs. While it
provides incentives for insiders and others with information
about unlawful conduct to come forward, it also encourages them
to work within their company’s own compliance structure.”18 In
the 2013 Asadi case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the SEC’s broad
interpretation of the statute, considering the SEC’s regulations
at odds with congressional intent. Let us now turn to a
discussion of that case.
III. Asadi Rejects the SEC Statutory Interpretation
Khaled Asadi, a dual United States and Iraqi citizen, was
employed by G.E. Energy in 2006 as the company’s Iraq County
Executive, a job which required him to relocate to Jordan. In
2010, G.E. was negotiating a joint venture agreement with the
Iraq Minister of Electricity. It was brought to Asadi’s attention
by someone in the Iraqi government that G.E. might have hired
a woman close to the Senior Deputy Minister of Electricity “in
order to curry favor with the Minister while negotiating a
lucrative Joint Venture Agreement.”19 According to Asadi, the
Deputy Minister specifically requested that she be hired.
Asadi, concerned that this action would be a violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),20 reported this to his
supervisor and also to the G.E. Energy ombudsperson for that
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-64545, 17 C.F.R. Parts
240 & 249 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/3464545.pdf.
17. For example, the regulations provide that a whistleblower's voluntary
participation in an entity's internal compliance and reporting systems is a
factor that can increase the amount of any bounty award.
18. SEC OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, ANN. REP. TO CONG. ON THE
DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM
(2013),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf.
19. See Am. Compl., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-20522).
20. The FCPA generally forbids individuals or companies from
endeavoring to influence foreign officials by offering, promising, or giving them
anything of value. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
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region. Shortly after Asadi expressed his concerns about these
activities, he received a negative performance review and was
pressured by his employer to step down from his position and
accept a role in the company with minimal responsibility. When
he did not do so, the following year he was fired.
Asadi brought a claim against his employer alleging, in part,
that his termination following his reporting of a possible FCPA
violation was impermissible under the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protection provision. At issue in the case was
whether Asadi was within the protection of that statute.
Conceding that he did not come within the literal definition
of a whistleblower since he did not provide information to the
SEC, Asadi asserted that he was still within the scope of DoddFrank based on that law’s description of protection for
whistleblowers. Asadi asked the court to read the provisions of
78u-6(h)(1)(A) as creating additional avenues of whistleblower
protection, specifically that since subparagraph (iii) does not
require disclosures be made to the SEC it provides protection
even for those individuals who do not fall within the literal
definition of a whistleblower.
In considering Asadi’s claim, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the
interplay between subsections (6)(a) and (6)(h) as illustrated in
Part I. Subsection (a) contains definitions for terms used
throughout the statute. “That definition [of whistleblower]
standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires that an
individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a
‘whistleblower’ for purposes of §78u-6.”21 Considering the
interpretation of legal texts, the court relied on the following,
“When a . . .definitional section says a word ‘means’ something,
the clear import is that this is its only meaning.”22
Ultimately, the Appeals Court disagreed with Asadi,
rejecting the notion that subparagraph (iii) defines who can
qualify as a whistleblower, and instead relied on the plain
language of the statute that there is only one category of
whistleblower – the one who provides information to the SEC.
The court interpreted subsection (iii) rather narrowly as simply

21. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
22. Id. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 226 (1st ed. 2012)).
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defining categories of protected activities in which a
whistleblower may engage. As a result, the court concluded
there was no conflict between the definition of whistleblower and
the third category of protected activity. Relying on Chevron,23
the court rejected the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term
whistleblower, stating, “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”24
As will be explained in Part IV, the Asadi court was incorrect in
its refusal to recognize the SEC regulations.
IV. The Authority of an Administrative Agency to Broaden a
Statutory Mandate Should be Upheld
An administrative agency is free to interpret the
construction of a statute created by Congress which was meant
to guide an agency in implementing Congress’s will in any given
area of law. The U.S. Constitution’s Article I, §1 states, “All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives.”25 The text is specific in that all legislative
powers are vested in Congress and the Supreme Court has ruled
that, “This text permits no delegation of those powers”.26
A. Powers of Administrative Agencies
Black’s Law Dictionary defines legislative power as,
The power to make laws and to alter them; a
legislative body’s exclusive authority to make,
amend, and repeal laws. Under federal law, this
power is vested in Congress, consisting of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. A
legislative body may delegate a portion of its
23. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
24. Id. at 842-44.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
26. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996)).
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lawmaking authority to agencies within the
executive branch for purposes of rule making and
regulation. But a legislative body may not
delegate its authority to the judicial branch, and
the judicial branch may not encroach on
legislative duties.27
One should note that in that definition, a distinction is made
between the law and a rule. A rule is defined as, “an established
and authoritative standard or principle[.]”28 So, if in fact
Congress is the only one who may make laws, why is it then that
an allowance is made for the creation of rules by means of a
delegation to agencies of a rule-making function? According to
the Supreme Court, “This Court [U.S. Supreme Court]
established long ago that Congress must be permitted to
delegate to others at least some authority that it could exercise
itself.”29
The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine fits well
within the Framer’s design of a workable National Government,
in that though the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power
to make laws, it does not prohibit a transfer of some of that
authority to another branch, thus freeing Congress to address
itself to more pressing legislative concerns.30
Therefore the delegation of rulemaking authority from
Congress to agencies is seen as a beneficial necessity for the
creation of a workable national government. There has also
been a realization that certain issues may pose a complexity
which Congress may be ill-suited to handle in the specific.31
The reach of the Federal Government’s
enumerated powers is broader still because the

27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (8th ed. 2004).
28. Id. at 1357.
29. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 (1996) (citing Wayman v. Southard, 6 L. Ed.
253 (1825)).
30. Id. at 771.
31. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 529-30 (1935) (recognizing "the necessity of adapting legislation to
complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national
legislature cannot deal directly").
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Constitution authorizes Congress to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. We have long read this provision
to give Congress great latitude in exercising its
powers: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”32
So given that a delegation of some of Congress’s authority is
allowed, if not required, we next address the question of what is
the appropriate percentage, scope and/or degree of that
delegation? This question was not lost on one of our founding
fathers, Thomas Jefferson, who said “Nothing is so
embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the
details of execution.”33 And it is to those details of execution that
we now turn our attention.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed a conferring of
decision-making authority upon agencies,34 Congress must “lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”35 The
purpose thereby is to provide a guide for the agencies’ exercise
of authority.36 The Court has also recognized the expertise of
administrative agencies. The U.S. Supreme Court in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, in discussing the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, said that the Act was being
“supervised by an expert administrative agency,”37 thus
confirming the EPA’s position as both an expert and as a
32. Nat’l Fed’n of Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
33. 5 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 319 (Paul
L. Ford ed., 1904) (letter to E. Carrington, (Aug. 4, 1787)).
34. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 457 (2001).
35. Id. at 472 (citing J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 409 (1928)).
36. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 463 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
37. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 305 (1981).
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supervisor.
Administrative agencies were created to be specialists in
given areas of the law, taking on the role of a supervisor, who
presumably, is guided by a set of instructions which Congress
would promulgate. There is an inherent problem in this
dynamic, in that the agency is being guided by someone, who is
not an expert in the field to be regulated. How can Congress
appropriately set the boundaries for the agency to operate
within, when they lack the technical knowledge of
understanding the scope of the problem to be dealt with? Many
times the extent of the problem, its subtleties, or its facets are
not even known until extensive factual material is analyzed and
evaluated by the agency experts. How can Congress set limits
on the agency action when Congress at the time of their
promulgation of an enabling statute does not understand the
exacting particulars of what is to be done?
The answer lies in the fact that the courts have taken the
position that it shall be sufficient for the purposes for delegation
of authority that Congress sets out the legislative policy for the
agency to follow, while leaving the details of specific
implementation to the agency. It also appears that the degree
of freedom delegated to the agency is for Congress to decide. The
Supreme Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment
that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”38
Therefore, it appears that the amount of freedom, or lack
thereof, granted to the agency, will be determined by Congress’
judgment and “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally
conferred.”39
Yet how should we discern the scope of Congressional intent
in that delegation of authority? Should we look to words alone?
Should we look to the overall tenor of the statute and its gleaned
general intent or should we look only to what Congress
specifically said? The answer has been fairly consistent for the
last 100 years, beginning with Justice Holmes understanding
that, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
38. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989).
39. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 748 (1996)).
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only what the statute means.”40
In 1984, the Supreme Court in the landmark decision of
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
outlined in a fairly concise fashion what the court will be looking
for when it is reviewing agency action and/or interpretation
pursuant to that agency’s enabling statute.
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of
the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in
the
absence
of
an
administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.41
Therefore based on Chevron, the freedom of agency action
and interpretation is based on the clarity of the intent of
Congress, as demonstrated in the language of the statute. “If
the intent of Congress is clear . . . the agency must give effect to
that unambiguous language.”42 That does raise the question of
whether the language chosen is “clear.” Is it possible for a word
which is chosen by Congress to be both singular in its denotative
definition as well as chosen for its connotative definition? The
Supreme Court has made clear that, when context permits, the
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
41. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
42. Id.
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agency is allowed to use its expertise in deciding the extent of a
definition.43
When the words chosen have definitions which lead to a
general interpretation the agency is allowed to interject its
expertise. But when the word chosen is one where there is little
doubt as to its meaning and extent, the agency’s actions are
limited. “[I]t is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.
The fact that a statute is unambiguous means that there is no
gap for the agency to fill and thus no room for agency
discretion.”44
B. The Scope of Agency Freedom
If the Congressional intent is silent or ambiguous what may
the agency do?
Again Chevron and its subsequent
interpretations give us the answer. In 2005 the Supreme Court
in Brand X stated thusly: “If statute is ambiguous, and
implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron
requires federal courts to accept agency’s construction of statute,
even if agency’s reading differs from what court believes is best
statutory interpretation.”45
Lest we forget, the court does want to make it clear that,
“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent.”46

43. In Whitman, the Court held that while Congress did not have to
provide direction to the EPA concerning how it defined “country elevators” that
were to be exempt from new stationary-source regulations governing grain
elevators, it did have to furnish substantial guidance on setting air standards
that affected the entire national economy. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475. Similarly,
the Court ruled that a congressional statute was not required to “decree how
‘imminent’ was too imminent, or how ‘necessary’ was necessary enough, or …
how ‘hazardous’ was too hazardous’” (citing Touby v. United States, 500 U.S.
160, 165-67 (1991), nor must a statute authorizing agencies to recoup “excess
profits” paid under wartime Government contracts define how much profit was
too much (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783-86 (1948). Id. at
475.
44. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843
(2012) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
45. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 969 (2005).
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 n.9.
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In 2001 in United States v. Mead Corp., the court found that
if agency power was not delegated then it was for the court to
“When an agency
decide the statutory interpretation.47
exercises delegated lawmaking power, the court must accept the
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. When an
agency is not exercising delegated lawmaking power, the court
interprets the statute giving appropriate deference, under the
circumstances, to the agency’s interpretation, but deciding for
itself the meaning of the statute.”48
Therefore, agency freedom is a direct consequence of the
specificity of the statutory language. The more generalized the
language, the more the courts are willing to allow the agency
freedom in the use of its expertise. The more restrictive the
language, the less the courts are willing to allow forays into
uncharted waters. Less clear is the outcome when the general
tenor of a statute is pointing in a general direction. Will the
court allow the agency to move into that area?
Turning our attention back to the proper interpretation of a
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank, the question remains how to
properly interpret the interplay between subsections (a) and (h).
The ambiguity created when these two subsections are viewed
together opens the door to the administrative interpretation
which should have been respected by the Fifth Circuit. In an
Amicus Curiae brief filed on February 20, 2014 in support of Liu
Meng-Lin, the appellant in a Second Circuit case, the SEC
states, “The examination of the relevant statutory language
demonstrates, at a minimum, considerable tension and
inconsistency within the text, thus revealing that Congress did
not unambiguously express an intent to limit the employment
anti-retaliation protections under Section 21F(h)(1) only to those
individuals who report securities law violations to the
Commission.”49
47. Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead and the Review of
Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21 (2011) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 238 (2001)).
48. Id.
49. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, MengLin v. Siemens, A.G., No. 13 Civ. 317, 2013 WL 5692504, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
21, 2013) (No. 13-4385). For additional discussion of this brief, see Mystica M.
Alexander, Defining the Whistleblower Under Dodd Frank: Who Decides? 5
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As will be illustrated in Part V, various district courts that
have commented on the difficult task of reconciling these two
apparently inconsistent positions have also overwhelmingly
agreed the provisions taken together are either “conflicting” or
“ambiguous,” and, therefore, should be applied with the broad
interpretation provided in the SEC regulations.
V. District Court Interpretations of Whistleblower Protection
Various district courts have been asked to interpret the
whistleblowing and reporting requirements of Dodd-Frank. The
Asadi court, while recognizing that several district courts have
ruled in favor of an expansive interpretation of the term
whistleblower, opted not to follow that line of reasoning. The
two opinions of Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc. involved a financial
software business that provided software to conduct trades on
the Internet.50 Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc.,51
concerned allegations of bribery under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.52 Lastly, Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp53 dealt with
alleged violations of the defendant company’s pension plan.54
Although each of the cases dealt with distinct fact patterns and
differing outcomes for the whistleblowers, one common thread
between them (and several other district court decisions
considering similar issues)55 is the acknowledgement that to
CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 278 (2014). In its August 2014 resolution of this case, the
Second Circuit failed to address this issue and decided the case on other
grounds.
50. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011); Egan v. TradingScreen Inc.,
No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2011).
51. See Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012).
52. Id. at 990. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
53. See Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136939, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
54. Id. at *1.
55. Other district courts in agreement with the SEC’s expansive
interpretation include: Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5: 14-cv-03144, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 153439 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F.
Supp 3d. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 134149, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31142 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014), aff'd on other
grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094
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come within the whistleblower protection of Dodd-Frank an
individual need not report directly to the SEC, but rather, in
certain circumstances, indirect reporting, such as through
company internal reporting is sufficient. We will review each of
these cases in turn. We will then turn our attention to two postAsadi district court cases. In Englehart v. Career Education
Corporation,56 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida followed the decision of the Asadi court. Less than two
weeks after the Englehart decision, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nebraska in Bussing v. COR Clearing LLC57
rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.
A. Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.
TradingScreen is a financial software business that
provides hedge funds, asset managers, private bankers, and
high net-worth individuals with software that helps them
conduct trades on the Internet. Defendant, TradingScreen
Brokerage Services, LLC (“TSBS”), is a broker-dealer affiliated
with TradingScreen, Inc. and Philippe Buhannic is Chief
Executive Officer of both TradingScreen, Inc. and TSBS.58
Patrick Egan, the plaintiff, began working for
TradingScreen in 2003. In early 2009, he learned Buhannic, the
CEO of Defendant, was diverting TradingScreen’s corporate
assets to another company that he solely owned, SpreadZero,
which offered products and services similar to those of
TradingScreen. In particular, Egan alleged that Buhannic was
using TradingScreen employees to do unpaid work for
SpreadZero, cannibalizing TradingScreen’s customer lists, and
invoicing SpreadZero at below-market rates for various services.
By late 2009, Plaintiff concluded that Buhannic’s behavior was
costing TradingScreen hundreds of thousands of dollars and
(D. Colo. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013);
Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.), LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71945, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
56. See Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014
WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014).
57. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014).
58. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103416, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
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posing a threat to the existence of TradingScreen’s business.59
In early 2010, Plaintiff reported Buhannic’s behavior to the
President of TradingScreen, Michael Chin, who passed the
information to those members of TradingScreen’s Board of
Directors who were not controlled by Buhannic (the
“Independent Directors”). The Independent Directors hired the
law firm of Latham & Watkins LLP (“Latham”) to conduct an
internal investigation. Latham issued a report confirming
Plaintiff’s allegations. As a result, the Independent Directors
informed Buhannic that he would have to resign, but he gained
control of the Board and thereby prevented them from forcing
his resignation. Buhannic then fired Chin and Plaintiff without
informing the Board.60
Egan claimed relief under the Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection provisions of Dodd-Frank, specifically
the portion of the statute that allows a private cause of action
for whistleblowers alleging retaliatory discharge or other
discrimination.61 He argued that he could bring an action
against Buhannic and TradingScreen under these antiretaliation provisions.62 However, Defendants contended that
these provisions did not cover Egan because he never personally
contacted the SEC to report Buhannic’s conduct.63 The court
found that Egan’s claim raised three questions: (1) whether any
disclosure to the SEC is required as a predicate to an action
under the whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions of DoddFrank; (2) if such disclosure is required, whether the party
invoking the Act must have personally and directly reported to
the SEC; and (3) whether Egan had adequately alleged that the
information he provided to attorneys retained by the
Independent Directors was ultimately reported to the SEC.64
Since he did not report information to the SEC, he attempted to
show that his disclosures fell under the categories of disclosures

59. Id. at *4-5.
60. Id. at *5-6.
61. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i)). Relief includes reinstatement,
double the back pay owed, costs and fees. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)).
62. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47713, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
63. Id. at *9.
64. Id.
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delineated by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) that do not require
such reporting: those under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Securities Exchange Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), or other laws and
regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.65 He could not
come under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because its whistleblower
provisions apply only to publicly-traded companies and
TradingScreen was a privately held company.66 Egan also
argued that he disclosed Buhannic’s violations of rules
promulgated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”), and that these disclosures fell under Dodd-Frank’s
protection of disclosures “subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.”67 The court rejected this argument because DoddFrank protects whistleblowers who fulfill an existing duty to
disclose, but it does not protect those who report violations of
SEC laws or regulations that do not impose such a duty.
Furthermore, the FINRA rules Egan cited do not impose a duty
to disclose.68 Finally, he claimed that his disclosures were
protected by section 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s incorporation of 18
U.S.C. § 1513(e), which prohibits “interference with the lawful
employment or livelihood of any person” who provides truthful
information “to a law enforcement officer” relating to the
commission of federal offenses.69 But the court held that he did
not allege that he or anyone acting jointly with him reported
Buhannic’s conduct to a law enforcement or government
authority other than the SEC. Therefore, it concluded, a claim
of whistleblowing under section 1513(e) still relied on the
question of whether Egan or anyone acting jointly with him did
in fact report to the SEC.70 Nevertheless, because he raised
factual allegations that supported his original pleading “on
information and belief” that his information concerning
Buhannic’s conduct was reported to the SEC, the court granted
him leave to amend his complaint.71 The court intended that his
amended complaint would plead facts supporting his knowledge,
65. Id. at *14.
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
68. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47713, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
69. Id. at *18-19.
70. Id. at *19.
71. Id. at *30.
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heretofore on “information and belief,” that Buhannic’s conduct
was reported to the SEC. It stated that such amendment would
be effective only if it supported knowledge of actual transmission
to the SEC.72 Nonetheless, the court found that his amended
complaint failed to state a claim under Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower protection provisions because the law firm to
whom Buhannic’s conduct was reported did not report his
actions to the SEC.73 Consequently the court dismissed his
Dodd-Frank claim,74 while acknowledging that “a literal reading
of the definition of the term ‘whistleblower’ in 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(a)(6), requiring reporting to the SEC, would effectively
invalidate § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of whistleblower
disclosures that do not require reporting to the SEC.”75
B. Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc.
Ron Nollner and his wife Beverly were Tennessee residents.
He had many years of experience in the construction industry
and was a devoted member of the Southern Baptist community.
Around April 2008, he responded to an International Mission
Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc, (IMB)76 job
posting to perform missionary-related work on the church’s
behalf in New Delhi, India. The posting solicited candidates to
manage construction of a new office building in New Delhi,
including working with local companies, assisting in obtaining
necessary permits, and ensuring that engineering standards
were followed. It also indicated that the term of employment
would be a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 36
months. Furthermore, it included a “Spouse Assignment
Description,” which stated that the candidate’s spouse would “be
a vital part of the team,” reflecting an intent to hire both the

72. Id.
73. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103416, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011);
74. Id. at *14.
75. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47713, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
76. IMB is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Southern Baptist Convention.
Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 2d 986, 989 (M.D. Tenn.
2012).

19

906

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

construction manager and his or her spouse.77
IMB encouraged the Nollners to take the positions
identified in the Job Vacancy Announcement. In October 2008,
at IMB’s urging, the Nollners accepted the positions, which they
understood would last at least one 36-month term.
In
anticipation of moving to New Delhi for this extended period, the
Nollners sold essentially all of their assets. Mr. Nollner gave up
his active construction career and his wife quit her job.78
When they arrived in New Delhi, the situation was not what
had been promised. The planning and permitting phase of the
project had already been completed and the defendants would
not allow Mr. Nollner to meet with the architect or contractor for
the job at issue until April 2009, well into the project. Over the
next several months, Mr. Nollner also became aware of much
disturbing information, including the contractor and architect
paying bribes to local Indian officials with money IMB furnished
as well as their attempting to bribe him.79 He reported these
practices and potential illegalities to his supervisors multiple
times, but they ignored his entreaties.80 When he reported his
grave concerns about potential bribery to the defendants’
employees, they “seemed unbothered, if not complicit.”81 In
October 2010, his superiors asked him to resign. After he
refused, he was terminated, his superiors claiming his position
was no longer necessary. When the Nollners returned to the
U.S, they instituted suit in Tennessee state court, which
defendants later removed to federal district court.82
The court cited Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “whistleblower”
as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 990.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The original complaint asserted claims for breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and retaliatory discharge under Tennessee common law
and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. When they added a claim under
Dodd-Frank, the defendants removed the case to federal district court on the
grounds that the court had original federal question jurisdiction over the DoddFrank claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. at
988.
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securities laws to the Commission [i.e., the SEC], in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 83 It
reviewed the anti-retaliation provision of the Act most relevant
to the Nollners, to wit:
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including
section 10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 78f(m)),
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule,
or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.84
Addressing the scope of this provision, the court noted that
its protections extend only to any “law, rule, or regulation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” so that where an
employee reports a violation of a federal law by the employer,
Dodd-Frank only protects that employee against retaliation if
the federal violation falls within the SEC’s jurisdiction.85 Thus,
the court stated, a plaintiff seeking relief under this provision
must demonstrate that the disclosure at issue relates to a
violation of federal securities laws, and that it is “required or
protected” by laws, rules, or regulations within the SEC’s
jurisdiction.86 Consequently, an employee is not protected from
retaliation if the disclosure at issue is not “required” or
otherwise “protected” by a law, rule, or regulation within the
SEC’s jurisdiction.87 The Nollners argued that their employer
violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act88 by bribing foreign
officials and it retaliated against them for reporting those
violations internally.89 The court noted that the FCPA provides
both criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms, with the
83. Id. at 992-93 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)).
84. Id. at 993 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).
85. Id. at 994.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et.seq.
89. Nollner v. S. Baptist Conventon, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 2d 986, 995-96
(M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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Department of Justice (DOJ) solely responsible for all FCPA
criminal enforcement and the SEC in charge of enforcement for
FCPA violations by issuers.90 Because the defendants were not
“issuers” and had not committed any securities violations, the
SEC had no jurisdiction over them, the court decided, and so it
refused to interpret Dodd-Frank as extending its whistleblower
protections to companies that otherwise have no relationship to
the SEC and have not committed securities violations.91 As
result, it dismissed the Nollners’ Dodd-Frank claim with
Although the Nollners did not qualify for
prejudice.92
whistleblower protection in the circumstances of this case,
significant for our purposes is the court’s acknowledgement that
Egan correctly determined that whistleblower protection could
be extended more broadly to those who do not provide
disclosures directly to the SEC but rather indirectly notify the
SEC through initiating reporting through internal company
reporting channels.
C. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp.
Richard Kramer began working for the Trans-Lux
Corporation in 1981, and for the past eighteen years had served
as its Vice President of Human Resources and Administration,
responsible for managing its relationship with the Pension
Benefits Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) oversight of the TransLux ERISA governed pension plan, ensuring company
compliance with all federal and state laws and regulations and
serving as plan sponsor/administrator on all benefit plans as
well as serving as fiduciary for its Defined Benefit and Defined
Contributions plans. His supervisor was Angela Toppi, TransLux’s Chief Financial Officer, and Jean Marc Allain, its Chief
Executive Officer.93
Kramer and Toppi both served as members of the company’s
pension plan committee. Although the pension plan required
the committee to have at least three members, since 2009 the
90. Id. at 996 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)).
91. Id. at 997.
92. Id. at 997-98.
93. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424(SRU), 2012 WL
4444820, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
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committee had only two members. Kramer repeatedly advised
Toppi that the committee needed at least one additional
member, but she rejected his advice.94
Not only did Toppi serve on the pension plan committee, but
she also was the sole trustee of Trans-Lux’s pension plan.
Kramer believed that her position as a trustee created a conflict
of interest, and reported his concerns to the company.
Specifically, Kramer was concerned that Toppi had inside
knowledge of Trans-Lux’s financial situation, and continued to
hold company bonds as a pension investment, even as they lost
nearly all of their value. Again, his concerns were rejected.95
In December 2008, March 2009, September 2010, and
January 2011, Trans-Lux amended its pension plan. The plan
required amendments to be made pursuant to the
recommendation of a three-person committee, but the 2010 and
2011 amendments were instead made at the recommendation of
a two-person committee. Toppi was also required to bring the
2009 amendments to the board of directors for approval. She
failed to do so, and also neglected to file the 2009 amendments
with the SEC.96
In March 2011, Toppi ordered Kramer not to file a Form 10
with the PBGC. The form would have notified the PBGC that
there had been a missed contribution, and would have subjected
Trans-Lux to an immediate penalty.97
Kramer continued to express his concerns to Toppi and
Allain but again they were dismissed. In May 2011, he contacted
Trans-Lux’s board of directors’ audit committee about his
concerns. Shortly thereafter, he sent a letter to the SEC about
Trans-Lux’s failure to submit the 2009 amendment to the board
of directors or the SEC.98 In July 2011, Kramer was fired,99 and
subsequently brought suit under Dodd-Frank.100

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424(SRU), 2012 WL
4444820, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
100. Id. at *1. He also bought a claim under the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Id. at *3.
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The court first wrestled with the definition of
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank and the anti-retaliation
sections, holding that it is broader with respect to the antiretaliation section than it is for the rest of the Act.101 It next
reviewed the SEC’s rule that states for the purposes of the
retaliation protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the
information you are providing relates to a possible
securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a
possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18
U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or
is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner
described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange
Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).102
The court next rejected Trans-Lux’s argument that Kramer
was not engaging in protected activity when he sent a letter to
the SEC, because he did not do so in a manner established by
the SEC, holding that Section 78u-6(a)(6)’s requirement that the
information at hand have been provided “in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, to the Commission” does not
apply to section 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Instead, the court reasoned,
someone must only allege that they possessed a “reasonable
belief that the information” provided “relates to a possible
securities law violation,” and that the information was provided
in a manner described in section 78u-6(h)(1)(A).103 The court
found that Kramer’s disclosures were related to violations of the
securities laws and that disclosures protected under SarbanesOxley’s whistleblower provision are also protected under DoddFrank’s whistleblower provision.
Sarbanes-Oxley protects
persons who disclose information they reasonably believe
101. Id. at *11 (citing Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.Supp.
2d 986, 989 (M.D.T.N. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202
(LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011)).
102. See Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F2(b)(1) (2015)).
103. Id. at *5 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)).
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constitutes a violation of SEC rules or regulations, when the
information is provided to, among others, “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct).”104 Kramer alleged that
Allain had supervisory authority over him, and that the TransLux audit committee may have had the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct. The court found that
Kramer’s emails and letter where he raised his concerns
demonstrated that he may have reasonably believed Trans-Lux
to be committing violations of SEC rules or regulations.105
Therefore, the court ruled that he alleged sufficient facts to
support a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim based on his internal
and external communications, and consequently denied TransLux’s motion to dismiss his Dodd-Frank claim.106
D. Englehart v. Career Education Corporation
Diana Englehart was employed as the Director of Career
Services at the Sanford Brown Institute, one of over ninety
schools run by her employer, Career Education Corporation
(“CEC”). As part of her responsibilities, Ms. Englehart was
responsible for preparing budgets and financial forecasts which
would then be made available to both shareholders and the
public.107 When Ms. Englehart noticed what she considered
“material misrepresentations” in the budgets and forecasts that
had been prepared by the Institute she relayed her concerns to
the Vice President of Operations at the Institute in November,
2010.108 Englehart believed that the misrepresentations, which
overstated both placement and enrollment numbers, were a
violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.109 Shortly
after expressing her objections, Englehart was placed on paid
leave. While on leave, she was fired. Englehart alleged this
104. Id. at *17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C)).
105. Id. at *17-18.
106. Id. at *18-19.
107. See Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-CV-444-T-33EAJ,
2014 WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014).
108. Id. at *2-*3.
109. Id. at *3.
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firing was done in retaliation for her objections to the proposed
figures for the budget and forecast and sought to come within
the protections of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program.110
In response, CEC maintained that Englehart failed to state
a claim on which relief could be granted. CEC’s objection was
based on the fact that Englehart did not provide any information
to the SEC and, therefore, could not come within the statutory
definition of a whistleblower found at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.111 The
district court found in favor of CEC, finding that, “allowing
individuals who do not satisfy the Dodd-Frank Reform Act
definition of “whistleblower” to bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. §
78u-6(h) would contradict the section’s title - ‘Protection of
Whistleblowers’.”112 The court refused to second guess what it
considered to be the unambiguous statutory language of DoddFrank.113
E. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC
On May 21, 2014, less than two weeks after the decision in
Englehart, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska
rejected the holding in Asadi and granted the plaintiff, Julie
Bussing, relief under the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protection
Program and allowed her claim to continue.114 Bussing is a CPA
who holds various Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) licenses.115
Bussing worked as an independent
contractor for COR Securities Holding, Inc. (COR) assisting with
due diligence for the company’s acquisition of Legent Clearing,
LLC, a company which had previously been investigated for
FINRA violations.116 To help address Legent’s prior regulatory
violations, Bussing developed a “Change of Control Plan” which
was to be implemented following COR’s acquisition in 2012.117

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
2014).
115.
116.
117.
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See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb.
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Id.
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COR offered Bussing the position of Executive Vice President of
Legent, which she accepted only after she was assured the
Change of Control Plan would be implemented.118
On January 1, 2012 Bussing began to work for Legent.
Although Christopher Frankel was CEO of Legent, Bussing was
orally assured that she would report directly to Steven
Sugarman, CEO of COR, and COR’s Board of Directors. In April
2012, FINRA began proceedings against Legent for various
violations of financial rules and as part of those proceedings
made requests for certain documents. While she was preparing
a response to FINRA’s requests, Bussing discovered additional
violations and potential violations of securities regulations and
FINRA rules.119 Although Sugarman and the COR directors
initially
approved
of
Bussing’s
investigation
and
recommendations, very soon after Bussing began implementing
auditing measures to assess potential violations, directors from
both COR and Legent expressed dissatisfaction with her
efforts.120 On April 29, 2012, Bussing submitted a report to COR
and Legent with descriptions of violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act and anti-money laundering rules and explanation of
Legent’s inadequate internal record keeping.121 Bussing was
asked to cease responding to FINRA’s requests. She refused to
do so. On May 4, 2012, Bussing was told she needed a vacation
and was put on paid leave, and, soon after, on approximately
May 20, 2012, her employment was terminated.122
Bussing brought twelve claims against COR and Legent,
among them a claim alleging retaliation in violation of the
whistleblower protection provision of Dodd-Frank.123
In
response, COR filed a motion to dismiss. The dispute on this
issue centers, in part, on whether Bussing qualifies as a
whistleblower despite the fact that she did not make any
disclosures to the SEC. Departing from the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in Asadi, the district court ruled that the term
“whistleblower” should be given its ordinary meaning for the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
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purposes of the retaliation section of the Act. The court stated,
When it is apparent that Congress intended a
word to be given its ordinary meaning,
notwithstanding the presence of a statutory
definition to the contrary, and when applying the
definition to provision at issue would defeat that
provision’s purpose, the Court will not
mechanically read the statutory definition into
that provision.124
The court found it illogical that Congress intended to
discourage internal reporting since internal reporting is often a
more efficient way of dealing with potential violations in the
workplace.125 The court, therefore, found that Bussing could
pursue her claim.126
VI. Public Policy Requires an Expansive Interpretation of
Whistleblower
Prudent public policy that protects the public interest
requires an expansive interpretation of whistleblower
protection. SEC regulations that offer a broad interpretation of
who may qualify as a whistleblower support one of the primary
goals of financial reform, that of enhancing the ability of the SEC
to enforce the securities laws. As such, contrary to the
conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Asadi, the SEC regulations
should be adopted and respected by the judiciary.
Limiting protection from retaliation only to those
individuals who report potential securities law violations
directly to the SEC will undermine internal compliance
programs. Internal compliance programs have been put in place
as a means of reducing fraudulent and illegal activity. “The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Department of Justice’s
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
and the SEC’s Seaboard Report, have long placed a premium on
124. Id. at 729.
125. Id. at 733.
126. Id. at 734-35.
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effective corporate compliance programs. Complaint procedures
have always been an integral part of any such program.”127 By
incentivizing only direct reporting to the SEC, the Asadi court is
supporting “a ‘race’ to the doorstep of the SEC”128 by the
whistleblower. Such a dynamic encourages reporting to the SEC
before giving the company an opportunity to address and correct
issues of concern.129
Recognizing the need to ensure that the external reporting
requirement does not undermine internal compliance the SEC,
final SEC rules have made clear that (1) participating in a
company’s internal reporting process could increase the amount
of any bounty payment130 and (2) an internal report by a
whistleblower that leads to a report by the company is
considered a report to the SEC by the whistleblower as long as
the information is provided to the SEC within 120 days of the
internal reporting.131 “The final rules drafted by the SEC
represent well-crafted regulations that strike a balance between
internal and external reporting.”132
“A perennial justification and a perennial objective of
financial regulatory reform is the restoration of investor trust
and confidence.”133 Enhancing the ability of the SEC to enforce
securities laws will help boost public confidence in corporate
America. Furthermore, an expansive interpretation of who is a
whistleblower will further Congress’ intent in passing DoddFrank. When the Act was passed, Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (DConn.), who shepherded the bill through the Senate, said the
127. Allan Dinkoff, Corporate Compliance Programs After Dodd-Frank
(2011),
available
at
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/corporate_compliance_post_doddfrank_aelc_oct.11.pdf.
128. Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance
World as We Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law
Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower
Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1039 (2012).
129. Id.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2015).
131. Id. § 240.21F-4(c)(3).
132. Blount & Markel, supra note 128, at 1057. See also Geoffrey Rapp,
Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73 (2012).
133. Ronald J. Colombo, Trust, Financial Services Regulation, and the
Dodd-Frank Act, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 8, 8 (2011).
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legislation would help restore Americans’ confidence in the
financial system.134 At the time of its passage in July 2010, he
was quoted as saying, “More than anything else, my goal was,
from the very beginning, to create a structure and architecture
reflective of the 21st century in which we live, but also one that
would rebuild that trust and confidence.”135
Lastly, financial scandals invariably impact stock prices.136
What really is at stake here involves the very foundation of the
capitalist system and its inherent premise that investors are to
be rewarded or penalized for taking financial risks in what is
assumed to be a level playing field. Bitter experience has shown
that the system cannot be left to its own devices but needs the
firm hand of regulatory oversight if it is to succeed in its mission
of attracting investment for entrepreneurial ventures.
Therefore, any regulatory reading of a statute that serves to firm
up or bolster stock prices ought to be encouraged and promoted.
A liberal interpretation of who is a whistleblower is such
reading.
For these reasons, it is imperative that the law provides
incentives and broad protections for those individuals who risk
their career and reputation by coming forward to expose
corporate wrongdoing and chicanery.
VII.

Conclusion

A review of the whistleblower protections of Dodd-Frank,
accompanying SEC regulations, and district court decisions of
both interpretations, makes clear that the ambiguity of the
statute should be resolved under the broad interpretation of the
SEC regulations. Viewing the definition of whistleblower
narrowly and in isolation, as was done in Asadi, creates the
illusion of clarity. Under Section 21F subsection 6(a), a
whistleblower is one who reports a violation of the securities
exchange laws to the SEC. But a statute should not be read in
134. Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST,
July 16, 2010, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071500464_pf.html.
135. Id.
136. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407,
408 (2002).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3

30

2015

ASADI: RENEGADE OR PRECURSOR

917

the absence of its other provisions. The anti-retaliation
subsection 6(h)(1)(A)(iii) describes other times when a
whistleblower is to be protected, one of which being when a
whistleblower makes disclosures to other parties, such as the
disclosures required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This lack of
a consistent reporting requirement calls into question
Congress’s intended definition of whistleblower. This failure of
clarity creates the ambiguity. The Supreme Court has said
repeatedly that if the statute is ambiguous, it is for the agency
to resolve this ambiguity in furtherance of the policy set forth in
the statute.
Consequently, the courts should reject the
conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Asadi and instead defer to the
SEC’s regulations.
This approach best supports the
comprehensive reform goals of Dodd-Frank and its public policy
mission to protect whistleblowers.
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